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Shareholder activism has been a growing problem in the corporate world, creating numerous
dilemmas for the board of directors of companies. Activist shareholders can unsettle a company,
pressuring the directors to make decisions according to the course of business the activists would
prefer, and thus interfering with the traditional role of directors as the decision-makers of a com-
pany. With this new development in the business world, legal scholars have been debating if this
activism needs to be controlled and, if so, what measures can be taken to reach a balance. This
Note examines the traditional corporate principles such as the shareholder primacy theory and the
principle of “one share, one vote,” evaluating the benefits and the costs of adhering to these theo-
ries amidst the changing landscape in the business and legal world. This Note then proposes that
the traditional concept of the duty of loyalty can be applied to activist shareholders, much like
it has been applied to the directors and majority shareholders in the past, based on a fact-by-fact
analysis.
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ABSTRACT 
Shareholder activism has been a growing problem in the corporate 
world, creating numerous dilemmas for the board of directors of 
companies. Activist shareholders can unsettle a company, pressuring 
the directors to make decisions according to the course of business the 
activists would prefer, and thus interfering with the traditional role of 
directors as the decision-makers of a company. With this new 
development in the business world, legal scholars have been debating 
if this activism needs to be controlled and, if so, what measures can 
be taken to reach a balance. This Note examines the traditional 
corporate principles such as the shareholder primacy theory and the 
principle of “one share, one vote,” evaluating the benefits and the 
costs of adhering to these theories amidst the changing landscape in 
the business and legal world. This Note then proposes that the 
traditional concept of the duty of loyalty can be applied to activist 
shareholders, much like it has been applied to the directors and 
majority shareholders in the past, based on a fact-by-fact analysis. 
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Given the billions of dollars in investments that hedge funds are able 
to bring in, the business world closely tracks these funds and the 
transactions they make. Recently, a relatively new class has emerged in 
the hedge fund landscape: “activist hedge funds.” Activist hedge funds 
pursue profits, not only through the regular mechanisms of a hedge fund, 
but by aggressively taking a role in directing the business strategies and 
activities in which they invest. These activists often utilize their position 
as shareholders to push a company’s board of directors into making a 
decision that may change the nature of the company substantially and, 
perhaps, harmfully. 
Take, for example, the tense battle between activists Starboard Value 
and Carl Icahn over Newell Brands, best known for producing Yankee 
Candles and Sharpies.1 Starboard Value sought to overthrow the whole 
board of directors, while Icahn wanted to replace some members with 
those of his choice.2 The corporation appeared to be sandwiched between 
the wishes of two activists clashing with one another. Demands from 
assertive activists like Carl Icahn typically garner Wall Street’s attention. 
Throughout the process of writing this Note, weekly New York Times 
Dealbook email alerts detailed his latest move.3 Similarly, several years 
ago, Bill Ackman of Pershing Square made headlines after attempting, 
and ultimately failing, to replace the chief executive officer (CEO) of 
JCPenney and overhaul its business to transform it into a more upscale 
department store.4  His recent activist effort also included a five-year 
                                                                                                                             
 1. Lindsay Fortado, Starboard Value Launches Proxy Fight at Newell Brands, FIN. 
TIMES (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/9824dc92-3848-11e8-8eee-e06bde01 
c544 [https://perma.cc/T5NX-VA7N]. 
 2. Id. 
 3. The period covered is primarily February and March of 2018. 
 4. Matteo Tonello, The Activism of Carl Icahn and Bill Ackman, HARV. L. SCH. F. 
ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (May 29, 2014), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/ 
2014/05/29/the-activism-of-carl-icahn-and-bill-ackman/ [https://perma.cc/UHZ9-QC 
6Z]. 
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campaign against Herbalife; the hedge fund mogul is currently suffering 
substantial losses after his endeavors fell apart.5 
These reports by the financial press and the attention they receive are 
problem-inducing. They distract the directors who must spend significant 
time, energy, and money issuing public statements and other forms of 
responses to the press.6 This can become a wasteful allocation of funds by 
the corporation, which, in turn, directly impacts the gains of its 
shareholders. Because many of these activists like Carl Icahn and Bill 
Ackman are highly subject to public scrutiny, the noise created by the 
media can also distract shareholders by clouding their judgment on what 
is truly in the best interests of the corporation. Furthermore, there is no 
guarantee that the publicity will have a positive effect. If the media 
attention hurts the corporation’s image, its stock prices could drop, 
causing direct harm to the shareholders. Public agitation is just one way 
in which minority shareholders (with less than fifty percent ownership 
interest), who actively pursue an agenda against the board of directors, 
can hurt the interests of the remaining body of shareholders. Their 
activism could be controlled using a particular principle of corporate law: 
by imposing a duty of loyalty on them. 
Part I of this Note discusses the traditional corporate law principle of 
“one share, one vote,” as well as the reasons and costs underlying this 
principle. This section will also discuss how the concept has evolved as 
hedge funds have taken a more aggressive role in shaping corporate 
governance. Part II outlines the dynamic dialogue in which a number of 
legal scholars—namely, Lucian Bebchuk, Iman Anabtawi, and Lynn 
Stout—have evaluated the advantages and disadvantages of this activism. 
Part III argues that hedge fund activist shareholders should be bound by 
a manifest duty of loyalty to the corporation and other shareholders when 
they push for a company to break up, take extreme measures against 
                                                                                                                             
 5. The New York Times Dealbook Brief for March 1, 2018 had a section titled 
“End of an era for Bill Ackman.” For more information about his campaign, see Matthew 
Goldstein, Ackman Ends His 5-Year Fight with Herbalife, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/28/business/dealbook/ackman-herbalife-pershing-
square.html [https://perma.cc/AG7F-HGJB]. 
 6. See James McRitchie, Directors Prepare for Shareholder Activism, CORP. 
GOVERNANCE (Jan. 28, 2016), https://www.corpgov.net/2016/01/directors-prepare-for-
shareholder-activism/ [https://perma.cc/Q4HM-EWDC] (“It is argued that companies are 
frequently spending money on distractions, while core functions and operations suffer. 
Activists talk to former employees, customers, competitors. Directors prepare for 
shareholder activism by doing much the same.”). 
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company valuation, or burden the board of directors to act quickly in 
implementing expensive defense measures against activist campaigns. 
Courts should also hold the duty of loyalty against these shareholders, 
much like how traditional corporate law binds directors and controlling 
shareholders. This Note suggests several situations where a fact-driven 
analysis applying the duty of loyalty could help curtail this form of 
shareholder activism. 
I. TRADITIONAL PRINCIPLE OF “ONE SHARE, ONE VOTE” 
AND ITS EVOLUTION 
One of the most fundamental building blocks of traditional corporate 
law is the idea of “shareholder franchise.”7  The shareholder primacy 
theory is a widely established doctrine in this area of law, taking the view 
that the foremost goal of a corporation is to promote shareholder interests, 
namely to maximize its profits so that the surplus distributed to the 
shareholders also increases.8 This theory prioritizes shareholder wealth, 
leading to a maximized surplus, and greater social utility.9 
This shareholder primacy theory sets up the traditional separation of 
ownership and management in corporate law. The structure involves three 
sets of players, listed in order of descending control: the shareholders, the 
board of directors, and the officers.10 Shareholders express their interest 
in the corporation and its governance by purchasing share(s) and gain 
votes in accordance with the number of shares bought.11 The shareholders 
have the power to elect the board of directors who make efficient business 
decisions. 12  As this Note will argue, however, shareholder activism 
demonstrated by aggressive hedge fund investors disturbs this process. 
Tied to the shareholder primacy theory is the idea of “one share, one 
vote,” that “each unit shall have the same power of control over the 
organization.”13 Thus, a shareholder who has just a single share in a 
                                                                                                                             
 7. Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, One Share, One Vote and the False 
Promise of Shareholder Homogeneity, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 445, 447-48 (2008). 
 8. Id. at 473 (citing FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 35–39 (1991)). 
 9. Id. at 465. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 463. 
 12. Id. at 470 (citing Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and 
Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 548 (2002)). 
 13. Id. at 446-47. 
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company still has the same procedural right as another shareholder who 
may possess fifty shares in the same company. An analogous concept can 
be found in the American political system with the operating principle 
that one citizen gets one vote in their exercise of the democratic process.14 
Similarly, each share is equivalent to each vote that the shareholder can 
exercise, so that the shareholder’s voting power is directly related to their 
financial interest in the company. 15  This means that, although each 
shareholder has the same procedural right as one another, their substantive 
rights may vary; as long as a share is owned, a shareholder will be able to 
vote (procedural right), but the weight of that vote would be less than 
another shareholder owning more shares. Thus, the number of shares 
owned effectively determines one’s substantive rights.16 
The presumption behind this theory, in order for it to operate 
perfectly, is that the shareholders have “similar if not identical” 17 
interests. Since the voting scheme is structured so that each share has the 
same voting weight, disproportionate voting power creates distorted 
interests. 18  Unlike the democratic system, shareholders buy their 
ownership votes and thus have distorted substantive rights and economic 
interests, especially between minority and majority shareholders.19 As 
Professors Grant Hayden and Matthew Bodie write in their Article, each 
shareholder’s “interests and preferences in a corporate election” 
demonstrate the number of shares that a shareholder owns and reflect the 
percentage of the residual (i.e., how much of the whole that particular 
shareholder owns).20 Activist minority shareholders with a small stake, 
however, are disturbing this process since they push the company to take 
actions that benefit themselves for the sake of majority shareholder 
interests, without having to bear agency costs. 
Based on this scheme, there are some benefits to the “one share, one 
vote” ideal. Theoretically, all shareholders have an equal incentive to 
reduce agency costs, leading to a more efficient corporate governance 
process.21 Furthermore, if the shareholders pursue similar interests, they 
                                                                                                                             
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 448. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 499 (citing EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 8, at 70). 
 18. Id. at 475. 
 19. Id. at 477. 
 20. Id. at 499. 
 21. Id. (citing Shaun Martin & Frank Partnoy, Encumbered Shares, 2005 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 775, 776 (2005)). 
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will ultimately share the same goals for the company and can reduce the 
likelihood of having a “war zone of competing preferences.”22 These 
benefits, of course, run on the presumption that all shareholders are 
identical—the lack of competing preferences would foster an efficient 
decision-making process. 
The reality, however, is that all shareholders are not equal—at least, 
not in terms of their interests. Different competing interests may emerge 
depending on how much control a shareholder has over the corporation. 
For example, the difference in the influence a controlling shareholder or 
a minority shareholder can wield in a company’s decision-making process 
can be substantial. As Hayden and Bodie note, the major upside of 
belonging to the majority is that one gets to enjoy the benefit of control 
while agency costs are lowered.23 Another problem that the authors point 
out is that not every shareholder’s voting power and interest in the profits 
are equivalent.24 A shareholder with greater voting power does not always 
have as great a stake in the profits, whereas someone with less voting 
power may have a greater interest in the residual.25 
Two additional potential conflicts hinder the “one share, one vote” 
ideal in practice. First, shareholders might not all agree on what wealth 
maximization means for a particular company.26 Perspectives on wealth 
maximization might vary depending on whether the shareholder focuses 
on the long-term or the short-term. 27  With the passage of time, 
“uncertainties multiply” and shareholder primacy is rendered 
meaningless.28 Moreover, “one share, one vote” is not the “timeless and 
natural” voting structure it once was. 29  Second, the diversity of 
                                                                                                                             
 22. Id. at 499. 
 23. Id. at 477. 
 24. Id. at 480–81. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 493. 
 27. See id. 
 28. See id. 
 29. Id. at 463 (citing Colleen A. Dunlavy, Social Conceptions of the Corporation: 
Insights from the History of Shareholder Voting Rights, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1347, 
1356 (2006)). Moreover, “one share, one vote” is not a required structure; some 
companies offer alternative voting structures. See Marco Becht & J. Bradford Delong, 
Why Has There Been So Little Block Holding In America?, in A HISTORY OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE AROUND THE WORLD: FAMILY BUSINESS GROUPS TO PROFESSIONAL 
MANAGERS 613, 653–57 (Randall K. Morck ed. 2005) (noting that the number of dual or 
multi-class share corporations listed on the New York Stock Exchange more than doubled 
from 1994 to 2001). 
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shareholders creates a diversity of interests. That is, a shareholder with a 
diversified portfolio is more interested in their overall investment success  
rather than in the success of one particular company; in contrast, a 
shareholder heavily invested in one company is likely to be more vigilant 
about that particular company’s success.30 Furthermore, there may be a 
difference between the interests of a controlling shareholder and a 
minority shareholder and conflict may arise; Hayden and Bodie maintain 
that “[i]t is the power of a ‘controlling’ interest that drives the law and 
economics of shareholder voting.”31 But as the landmark case Kahn v. 
Lynch Communications System, Inc. demonstrates, a minority shareholder 
can also have control, despite an ownership percentage that is less than 
fifty percent, based on how much influence it can wield on the board of 
directors.32  
In most cases, individual shareholders of a publicly-traded company 
have little motivation to stay involved in corporate matters, since the 
shares they own are often insignificant.33 Individually, their shares do not 
produce sufficient voting power to sway the decision-making process; 
thus, they take a more passive role because it is unlikely that they will 
influence corporate policy. As such, the cost of being involved in the 
corporate affairs outweighs the potential benefit of their shareholder 
interest.34 As Professors Anabtawi and Stout explain, “[w]hen the largest 
single [shareholder] interest amounts to but a fraction of one percent—
the case in several of the largest American corporations—no stockholder 
is in the position through his holdings alone to place important pressure 
upon the management.” 35  Dispersed ownership was a common 
phenomenon in public companies and, traditionally, directors and officers 
have been at the forefront of dictating corporate policy in these firms.36 
There have been instances, however, where individual shareholders 
grouped together to form a controlling interest—large enough to vote out 
                                                                                                                             
 30. Id. at 493. 
 31. Hayden & Bodie, supra note 7, at 474. 
 32. 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994) (holding that a 43.3-percent shareholder has a 
controlling or dominating interest and has the power to influence the votes of non-
controlling shareholders). 
 33. Hayden & Bodie, supra note 7, at 474–75 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 228). 
 34. Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 
STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1257–58 (2008). 
 35. Id. at 1274–75 (quoting ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE 
MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 84 (1933)). 
 36. Id. at 1258. 
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the incumbent board.37 After some time and recent developments in the 
realm of finance, the rise of “institutional investors” is changing the 
shareholder landscape.38 Anabtawi and Stout explain that “[i]nstitutional 
investors—typically pension funds and mutual funds—aggregate the 
savings of millions of individuals into enormous investment portfolios 
that buy stock in public companies. As a result, institutional investors can 
take far larger positions in particular companies than most individual 
investors ever could.”39 Such institutional investors include high-profile 
business entities like Blackstone. 
Most institutional investors want to maintain a diversified 
investment portfolio.40 They owe a fiduciary duty to their clients to make 
money for them.41 The activist hedge funds, however, diverge from this 
path because their aim is not to diversify their portfolios.42 Rather, their 
strategy is “to take large positions in as few as two or three companies 
and then demand that those companies pay special dividends, launch 
massive stock buyback programs, sell assets, or even put themselves on 
the auction block in order to add ‘shareholder value.’”43 Because the 
companies they invest in are not as diversified as conventional mutual 
funds, such companies are strategic, and this investment style can lead to 
conflict of interest concerns.44 For instance, a conflict of interest can occur 
when they want to seat someone on the board who is associated with the 
fund or some other company of which the hedge fund is a shareholder.45 
Depending on the situation, they may also employ the “wolf pack” 
strategy to pressure management into following the course of action 
proposed by the activists.46 Investment strategies utilized by hedge funds 
                                                                                                                             
 37. Hayden & Bodie, supra note 7, at 474–75. 
 38. Id. at 487. 
 39. Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 34, at 1275. 
 40. Id. at 1278. 
 41. See Craig C. Martin & Matthew H. Metcalf, The Fiduciary Duties of Institutional 
Investors in Securities Litigation, 56 BUS. LAW. 1381, 1404 (2001) (“Institutional 
investors . . . have five affirmative fiduciary duties[]. First, the fiduciary must act solely 
in the interest of the plan participants and beneficiaries and for the exclusive purpose of 
benefitting the plan’s participants.”). 
 42. Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 34, at 1279. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See generally Simon Wong, Barriers to Effective Investor Engagement, 
FINANCIAL TIMES (Jan. 15, 2012, 3:54 AM), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm 
?abstract_id=1989455 [https://perma.cc/D84J-4B63]. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 34, at 1279. 
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generally produce short-term gains and make it unlikely that an activist 
shareholder will pursue an agenda purely for the interest of the overall 
corporation with an eye toward long-term benefits.47 This power play 
creates “a new genre of public company shareholder that is aggressive, 
wealthy, and eager to play a role in setting corporate policy.”48  The 
tendency of these activists to be aggressive in their proposals makes one 
skeptical that they are doing it for reasons other than self-interest (i.e., to 
generate profits for their hedge funds).49 They often push for substantial 
changes in a very short period of time.50 
Professors Anabtawi and Stout demonstrate this dynamic by 
illustrating a scenario where a hedge fund invests in a large block of 
shares in a troubled biotech company. 51  The hedge fund investor, 
attempting to raise the stock price, presses management to sell the 
company, except that there is no buyer willing to pay the premium until a 
large health sciences corporation announces that it wants to acquire the 
firm.52 Then, “the hedge fund buys [ten percent] of the common stock of 
the possible acquirer,” becoming a shareholder in the potential acquirer 
and obtaining the right to vote.53 The hedge fund also hedges its shares in 
the acquirer and informs the board of the acquirer that if any of the 
directors veto the purchase of the biotech company, the hedge fund will 
use its shareholder power to start a proxy contest to remove the director 
or directors that vetoed the transaction.54 There is an eerie feeling of self-
dealing that pervades the scenario described. Even though the biotech 
company faced difficulties, the activist investor did not pursue the actions 
                                                                                                                             
 47. See Long-Termism Versus Short-Termism: Time for the Pendulum to Shift?, 
INSTITUTIONAL INV. (June 13, 2016), https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/ 
b14z9mxp09dnn5/long-termism-versus-short-termism-time-for-the-pendulum-to-shift 
[https://perma.cc/6SVK-YKWH] (“Lastly, the rise of and prominent role played by 
“activist” investors is seen as further evidence of secular trends encouraging short-term 
behaviors at the expense of long-term thinking.”). 
 48. Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 34, at 1279. 
 49. See Long-Termism Versus Short-Termism, supra note 47 (“Activist funds buy 
shares, get board seats, and then employ their strategy to unlock value from the company. 
More often than not, unlocking value entails some form of financial engineering that 
drives up the share price and ultimately allows the activist fund to profit from its initial 
investment.”). 
 50. Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 34, at 1291. 
 51. Id. at 1258–59. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 1259. 
 54. Id. at 1259. 
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above to improve the well-being of the corporation, but rather for the 
hedge fund to make profits and, thus, hedge its shares. It is possible that 
the acquisition resulted in the purchase of shares at a premium, but if there 
was a possibility of having a larger premium or a higher price in the long 
run, then the rest of the shareholders lost out on that opportunity and did 
not have the chance to make an informed decision. This situation, creating 
an eerie feeling of self-dealing, is a problem and, thus, the duty of loyalty 
should apply to a hedge fund investor. 
II. SUPPORTERS AND OPPONENTS OF SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM 
There are various schools of thought among the legal academia 
community as to whether the rise of hedge fund activism in the 
shareholder context is a problem and whether any measures should be 
taken to curb it. This section attempts to delineate the major arguments of 
leading scholars. 
A. PROPONENTS 
Professor Lucian Bebchuk asserts that the aggressive approach taken 
by hedge fund shareholders is actually beneficial to a corporation, and 
that the board of directors should not be granted with greater insulation.55 
He argues that shareholder power should increase generally, not only 
regarding the power to replace directors.56 Bebchuk makes a distinction 
between two categories of corporate decisions: 1) “rules-of-the-game” 
decisions, which are those similar to classic shareholder powers, 
including the power to amend the charter and the power to change the 
company’s state of incorporation;57 and 2) “game-ending” decisions, such 
as the decisions to merge, sell assets, or dissolve the company.58 This Note 
focuses on the latter type of decision-making, as this is what hedge fund 
activists tend to push the board to do. 
In his discussion of rule-of-the-game decisions, Bebchuk primarily 
argues that the law should be changed to permit provisions in corporate 
charters that grant intervention power to shareholders.59 The Delaware 
                                                                                                                             
 55. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. 
L. REV. 833, 836 (2005). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 836–37. 
 58. Id. at 837. 
 59. Id. at 841. 
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General Corporation Law provides the general rule that any director or 
the entire board may be removed by a majority vote of shareholders.60 
According to Bebchuk, the current shareholder franchise includes only 
the power to veto, a “negative power,” as opposed to “the power to initiate 
rule changes.” 61  Under his proposal, shareholders would have the 
authority to intervene in specific business decisions only if the charter 
were drafted to specifically include this power.62 In his view, shareholders 
should have the power to initiate, in addition to the power to veto, because 
the power to veto does not maximize shareholder value.63 The power to 
initiate would allow shareholders to intervene if they deem that the board 
is not seizing lucrative opportunities, such as selling the company to a 
potential acquirer.64 Bebchuk explains his reasoning for such a proposed 
regime: “In publicly traded companies with dispersed ownership, the 
interests of management do not fully overlap with those of shareholders, 
and management thus cannot be automatically counted on to take actions 
that would serve shareholder interests.”65 As such, one primary reason 
behind the push for greater shareholder independence and power is a 
concern for agency costs, specifically the costs of having management 
make decisions on behalf of the shareholders. 
One wonders, however, if these agency costs are truly reduced in the 
context of shareholder activism; how does one guarantee that a 
shareholder activist speaks for most shareholders? Management, on the 
other hand, might be more likely to speak for most shareholders; there is 
the basic presumption that a manager will prioritize the interests of the 
corporation as the principal consideration in their decision-making 
process (when not acting in their own self-interest), “with a view towards 
maximizing corporate profit and shareholder gain.”66 Additionally, most 
shareholders are not involved in the day-to-day operations of the 
company; even the activist shareholder, who may be business-savvy, is 
                                                                                                                             
 60. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k) (2018). 
 61. Bebchuk, supra note 55, at 862. 
 62. Id. at 865. 
 63. Id. at 862. 
 64. Id. at 840. 
 65. Id. at 850. 
 66. Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Good Faith in Corporate Law, 31 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 1, 8 (2006). 
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not heavily involved in the fine details of the operations.67 Under the 
current corporate scheme, corporate boards of directors are elected by 
shareholders, thus owing a fiduciary duty to them.68 On the flip side, if 
directors are not upholding shareholder interests or the shareholders are 
dissatisfied, there is always the possibility of being voted out.69 For this 
structure to work effectively, the assumption is that the board of directors 
would be objective in their decision-making and endeavor to generate 
shareholder value, i.e., to maximize the profit of the company.70 Because 
many directors are now compensated in the form of stock options, they 
are shareholders as well, which, in practice, should incentivize them to 
promote the overall shareholder interest—not just their own.71 
Bebchuk also addresses counterarguments that those who support 
management insulation are likely to make—mainly, the critique of short-
term horizons.72 He writes: 
Supporters of management insulation might also worry that 
shareholder-initiated proposals might be motivated by considerations 
other than the enhancement of long-term share value. Some 
shareholders, it might be argued, have special interests or a social 
agenda, and might consequently favor changes that serve their own 
agenda but not long-term shareholder value.73 
Bebchuk rebuts this view favoring management insulation by 
pointing out that changes need to be made by the majority of shareholders 
and that “[a] proposal that seeks to advance special interests or an activist 
agenda at the expense of shareholder value would have no meaningful 
chance of obtaining majority support.” 74  In addressing the special 
category of institutional investors that follow high-turnover strategies, 
                                                                                                                             
 67. Principles of Corporate Governance, BUS. ROUNDTABLE 5 (2012) 
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/brt_cgov_principles_27mar2012_en.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/K4KQ-99UB]. 
 68. Bebchuk, supra note 55, at 851. 
 69. August Jackson, Does a Corporation Owe Fiduciary Duty to Shareholders?, 
HOUS. CHRON., https://smallbusiness.chron.com/corporation-owe-fiduciary-duty-share 
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Bebchuk argues that their preferences of charter provisions might align 
with those of long-term shareholders and would not lead to a conflict.75 
Based on this expansion of the shareholders’ ability to make “rules-
of-the-game” decisions, Bebchuk argues that shareholders should also 
have the right to make “game-ending” decisions—meaning, the ability to 
intervene in specific business decisions—to the extent they are granted by 
the charter under the proposed regime.76 This Note questions whether 
there would be a need for a board of directors, since the dichotomy 
between management and ownership is often blurred. 
Nonetheless, Bebchuk notes several advantages under the proposed 
scheme of increasing shareholder authority in the decision-making 
process. First, the intervention power would allow shareholders to react 
more actively to tender offers, namely, to make a counter-offer.77 Second, 
shareholders would be in a better position to pursue their interests in the 
case of management’s possible informational advantage.78 The board of 
directors and corporate officers may have a leg up on access to nonpublic 
information about the company, such as the company’s investments and 
projections in growth and value, that might be essential in business 
decisions such as mergers and acquisitions. 79  Bebchuk argues that it 
would be a balancing test for shareholders: (1) in recognizing this 
informational advantage; and (2) in that the management, equipped with 
such information, may oppose certain transactions for self-serving 
reasons.80 For example, management will inherently oppose decisions 
that terminate the company—even though it might be the best alternative 
for shareholders—because management will be unemployed or, at the 
very least, substantially lose their control and the benefits that may come 
with that control.81 Bebchuk’s biggest overall concern seems to be that 
even if management has greater insulation from shareholder action, there 
is no guarantee that they will always act in the best interests of the 
shareholders.82 
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B. CRITICS 
Leading scholars that oppose greater shareholder intervention, for 
which Bebchuk advocates, include Iman Anabtawi and Lynn Stout.83 
They first address the concern of short investment horizons that many 
institutional investors are prone to seek.84 Due to the hyperactive nature 
of hedge funds and their potential to turn over their portfolios several 
times in a fiscal year, activist shareholders often pressure management to 
“pursue policies that raise share price in the short term but fail to help the 
company, and even harm it, in the long run.”85 There are three strategies 
commonly employed by activist hedge funds to increase the stock price 
without enhancing business operations: 1) sell the company, 2) pay 
special dividend or stock repurchase, or 3) produce short-term earnings 
(but jeopardize long-term results).86 
Professor Stephen Bainbridge also disagrees with Bebchuk’s 
approach to shareholder activism.87 Bainbridge first argues that if the 
corporate governance structure were as problematic as some scholars 
argue, the scheme would not have survived this long without undergoing 
a major revamping, and the U.S. economy has not suffered as a result of 
the alleged flaws in governance systems.88 
Bainbridge’s main argument lies in the recognition that “limited 
shareholder voting rights is corporate law’s majoritarian default.”89 To 
begin, Bainbridge points out that every organization invokes a method of 
collecting individual preferences into a group decision.90 This implies that 
some agency costs are inevitable because the board of directors, rather 
than individual shareholders, makes business decisions. Bainbridge 
writes further: 
That we choose not to eliminate agency costs by eliminating the 
board’s power of fiat suggests that vesting discretion in directors’ 
hands has substantial values. A complete theory of corporate 
governance thus requires balancing the virtues of discretionary fiat 
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against the need to ensure that such power is used to further the 
interests of shareholders.91 
This Note agrees with Bainbridge’s point and takes the position that 
Bebchuk’s proposal tips the balance between the rights of shareholders 
and the board of directors to the side of shareholders. For instance, 
Bainbridge mentions a key doctrine of corporate law—the business 
judgment rule—and agrees with Bebchuk that it is an insulating 
instrument for the board of directors. 92  Unlike Bebchuk, however, 
Bainbridge does not view this negatively, because “corporate law must 
strive to balance authority and accountability”93—some freedom must be 
given to the board of directors to efficiently run a company. 
Following this line of thought, Bainbridge explains why he opposes 
expansive shareholder voting rights.94 He writes that “[a]ctive investor 
involvement in corporate decision-making seems likely to disrupt the 
very mechanism that makes the widely-held public corporation 
practicable: namely, the centralization of essentially nonreviewable 
decision-making authority in the board of directors.”95 
This power play between the management and the shareholders is 
further complicated by a relatively new phenomenon called empty voting. 
Henry Hu and Bernard Black, leading scholars on this topic, begin with 
the presumption that the right to vote is the foundation of shareholder 
power.96 Hu and Black identify a trend where hedge funds and other 
businesses decouple ownership and voting power by having more votes 
than shares; they call this new trend “empty voting” because “the votes 
have been emptied of an accompanying economic stake.”97 Thus, voting 
rights are greater than the net number of shares owned by a particular 
shareholder.98 
One way empty voting occurs is through the share lending market, 
in which an investor (often a hedge fund) allows another entity to borrow 
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the investor’s shares in a corporation.99 There is a lack of disclosure 
requirements and, thus, it is difficult to monitor who owns how many 
shares.100 Hu and Black note that “it is no accident” that hedge funds are 
often involved in this market.101 For example, a hedge fund might own 
seven million shares in a pharmaceutical company, Company T. 102 
Another pharmaceutical company, Company M, agreed to buy Company 
T in a stock merger, but Company M’s stock price drops when the merger 
is announced. 103  The hedge fund then buys 9.9-percent shares of 
Company M in an effort to ease obtaining shareholder approval for the 
merger.104  The hedge fund, however, hedges its shares, meaning that 
while its voting ownership was 9.9-percent, its economic ownership is 
zero.105 Ultimately, the situation was such that the more Company M paid 
for the target, the more the hedge fund profited.106 
As Hayden and Bodie point out, vote selling disrupts the shareholder 
franchise and is another form of disproportionate voting: the right to 
control (over the board) is detached from the right to (and the economic 
interest in) the residual. 107  The authors further provide a possible 
motivation for a shareholder to lend their voting right to someone else: 
“money coupled with ignorance.”108 Financial institutions figured out a 
way to make profit by leasing their shares for a fee while still having the 
nominal status of shareholder and, thus, the right to company profits.109 
These financial institutions have nothing to lose by hedging their shares; 
in fact, there is more to gain, as there is an opportunity to make money 
through share lending and receive a residual from their status as 
shareholders. 110  This enterprise seems completely unfair to other 
shareholders, especially if they have genuine and legitimate interests in 
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the corporation and the wealth the company is expected to generate and 
distribute. 
This Note concerns practices like empty voting in which the 
shareholder franchise is significantly distorted. The shareholder-empty 
voter is exercising the vote even though their interest is not aligned with 
that of a conventional shareholder—that is, to maximize corporate profits 
so the shareholder would also get a larger piece of the pie.111 The different 
economic interest and reduced stake in the success of the corporation 
might increase the tendency of the empty voter to vote without prioritizing 
the interests of the corporation. 112  Thus, the empty voter could 
theoretically participate in decisions that would harm the corporation and, 
as a result, harm the interests of other shareholders. With regard to the 
“one person, one vote” analogy, just as a citizen has the right to vote and 
ideally make an informed decision about an issue that impacts the country 
or state, a shareholder has a right to vote because he or she owns shares 
and ideally cares enough about the corporation and its well-being.113 With 
empty voting, however, it seems that the ownership interest goes away, at 
least for the period of time that the shares are “borrowed.”114 This Note is 
concerned with this phenomenon, predominantly practiced by hedge 
funds, and suggests that this could be a situation that triggers a duty to 
other shareholders. Since the interests of shareholders could be directly in 
conflict with one another, the “empty voter,” by partaking in the 
shareholder enterprise, should not act in ways that only benefit them by 
using the shares to make profits. Empty voting would pose a threat when 
activists contemporaneously shake things up and hedge their shares, thus, 
exerting an influence without sharing the stakes. To other shareholders 
who actually have economic interests at stake, this empty voting exercise 
would be unfair. 
III. FIDUCIARY DUTY OF LOYALTY 
This section will delve into the duty of loyalty. The Note will first 
explain the traditional version of the doctrine, as it stands in corporate law 
today. Then, the Note will argue that this duty should be broadened to 
address the problems discussed above. 
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A. TRADITIONAL PRINCIPLE 
The traditional corporate doctrine of the duty of loyalty lies in the 
duty owed by a corporation’s board of directors to its shareholders. This 
duty requires management to prioritize the interests of the company and 
the shareholders above management’s interests.115 Several scenarios can 
trigger this duty, such as transactions that result from unfair self-
dealings.116 If a shareholder sues the board of directors for a breach of the 
duty of loyalty and a disinterested board of directors approved the 
associated transaction, courts apply a “business judgment rule” standard 
of review.117 During litigation, the plaintiff must first demonstrate that the 
alleged transaction was tainted by self-interest.118  Then, the board of 
directors has the burden to show that the transaction was intrinsically 
fair. 119  There are two components or possibilities of demonstrating 
fairness: fair price and fair dealing.120 
There have been cases finding that controlling shareholders owed a 
duty of loyalty as well. 121  These scenarios usually involved majority 
shareholders because courts often deem a shareholder to be controlling 
only when they “exert ‘actual control’ over the corporation.”122 Here, it 
seems that actual control is reflected by having more than fifty percent 
ownership of the shares; in other words, the actual number of shares that 
leads to voting power influential enough to sway the board triggers the 
duty.123 As Anabtawi and Stout note, courts refuse to immediately apply 
the duty of loyalty to shareholders owning less than a majority share, and 
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instead look to the specific circumstances of the case to decide whether 
the defendant had enough shares to replace the board.124 Current case law 
does not seem to comment upon shareholders that hold a significantly 
smaller number of shares, but may still have enough influence over the 
board. 
One common scenario where the controlling shareholders exercise 
their power, and possibly breach their fiduciary duty, is the context of 
“freeze-out” mergers. A “freeze-out” merger occurs when minority 
shareholders are forced to sell their stocks at substantially low prices 
because the acquirer is another entity owned solely by the controlling 
shareholder.125 Kahn v. Lynch Communications Systems, Inc.126 illustrates 
this scenario. The court held that Alcatel controlled Lynch, even though 
Alcatel only owned forty-three percent of Lynch’s shares, because Alcatel 
dominated Lynch’s corporate affairs.127 The court further found that the 
parent-subsidiary scheme was an example of a situation in which the 
controlling shareholder was on both sides of the transaction. 128  The 
resulting self-dealing was unfair, leading courts to apply a heightened 
standard of “intrinsic fairness” to examine situations like freeze-out 
mergers. 129  In the recent case In re Tesla Motors, Inc. Stockholder 
Litigation, however, the Delaware Chancery Court found that Elon Musk, 
the largest shareholder of the company (owning 22.1-percent of common 
stock), 130  was a controlling shareholder. 131  The court considered 
circumstantial evidence, including Musk’s past behavior, his current 
status at the company, and public statements the company made about 
Musk regarding his influence on Tesla’s business decisions.132 Despite 
Musk’s minority ownership, these factors are relevant to the analysis of 
activist shareholders.133 If one were to define control based on how much 
influence a shareholder can exert on the company, then it would be more 
likely that an activist shareholder be deemed a controlling shareholder. 
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This would align with the traditional corporate law doctrine of applying a 
duty of loyalty to a controlling shareholder. 
The duty of loyalty is also found in the context of closely held 
corporations. Courts often hold that shareholders in a closely held 
corporation owe fiduciary duties to one another. 134  The classic case 
illustrating this rule is Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Company.135 In this 
case, the court established three characteristics of a closely held 
corporation.136  First, there are only a few number of shareholders.137 
Second, the shareholders participate heavily in management; in other 
words, there is no clear line between ownership and management.138 
Third, there is no ready public market for a discontented shareholder to 
sell their shares. 139  The disadvantageous position of the minority 
shareholder makes it easy for the majority to threaten the minority’s 
interests. 140  Anabtawi and Stout draw parallels between the majority 
domineering the minority in a closely held corporation and the activist 
shareholder in that both “majority” groups, despite not possessing over 
fifty percent of the outstanding shares, exert control over the minority: 
When a single shareholder’s actions determine the outcome—when 
an activist successfully extracts greenmail, or a hedge fund with a five 
percent stake casts the deciding vote in a hotly-contested merger—
that minority activist, like the minority shareholder in Smith v. Atlantic 
Properties, 141  has exercised “ad hoc” control and triggered latent 
loyalty duties.142 
B. DUTY OF LOYALTY REVAMPED – ANABTAWI AND STOUT VERSION 
With the traditional duty of loyalty underpinning the types of 
situations outlined above, Anabtawi and Stout propose that the law of 
fiduciary duty should apply to self-serving shareholders and their 
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opportunistic behaviors. 143  They identify the “underlying disease” as 
shareholder optimism, and suggest that all shareholders owe latent duties 
to the corporation and other shareholders.144 According to these scholars, 
there are two advantages of using this strategy.145 First, the traditional 
fiduciary duty of loyalty principle will be more aligned with the changing 
landscape of shareholder activism, offering the possibility of a more 
flexible resolution. 146  Second, their reinterpretation of shareholder 
fiduciary duty will not conflict with the emerging school of thought that 
shareholder democracy is an important tool to curb managerial 
misbehavior.147 
Anabtawi and Stout propose that fiduciary duties should apply when 
certain shareholders have the power to direct a particular corporate 
decision to their liking.148 By broadening the definition of control, they 
argue that this duty applies, not only to controlling shareholders, but also 
to minority shareholders who can sway a single transaction in a way in 
which they become the but-for cause.149 They also expand upon the scope 
of duty of loyalty scenarios to, not only freeze-out mergers and closely 
held corporations, but also to situations involving self-dealing, in which 
the breaching shareholder excludes other shareholders from enjoying the 
benefit they reap from said breach.150  Anabtawi and Stout frame the 
analysis in the following way: 
[A] broad-brush approach that mirrors the flexible approach typically 
taken in duty of loyalty cases involving corporate officers and 
directors. Rather than trying to identify isolated instances which 
shareholder conflicts arise, our approach instead asks the larger 
question typically asked in director and officer fiduciary duty cases: 
Does the shareholder have any material economic interest, in any 
form, that is different from other shareholders’ interests in the 
matter?151 
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Veering from this framework, this Note argues that, instead, the 
approach should apply in specific instances where the activist alarms a 
company when they propose that a board makes a corporate decision that 
can ultimately change the nature of the business, thus harming the 
shareholder enterprise. As argued by Anabtawi and Stout, the primary 
factor in determining that duty of loyalty should apply is whether the 
shareholder exerts enough pressure to sway the board of directors, not 
whether a shareholder is able to vote a majority of the company’s 
outstanding shares.152 
When analyzing a shareholder’s duty of loyalty, there is a close focus 
on the motive underlying a shareholder’s action.153 Much of the case law 
deals with a conflict of interest that “clearly and affirmatively harms the 
corporation or other shareholders.” 154  With the rise of hedge fund 
activists, however, the harm is not always immediate or apparent.155 Thus, 
Anabtawi and Stout suggest a reinterpretation of the loyalty principle to 
include situations when a shareholder promotes a certain transaction that 
yields a personal benefit to that shareholder and that shareholder only.156 
C. ADDITIONAL NARROWING OF THIS DUTY 
At the crux of this quagmire of shareholder activism is the question 
of when hedge fund activists should be bound to this duty of loyalty. This 
Note, based on the author’s observations from current events, comes up 
with three particular, though not exclusive, instances when the duty 
should apply: (1) when the shareholder activist proposes that a company 
break up, (2) when extreme measures are taken to weaken company 
valuation, and (3) when the activist unreasonably burdens a board of 
directors to act quickly and to put on costly defense measures against 
activist campaigns. For instance, when Carl Icahn tried to break up the 
insurance company AIG, the board of directors had to vehemently fight 
against him.157 Icahn threatened a proxy fight unless the board agreed to 
break up the company.158 The hedge fund activist reasoned that AIG was 
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better off not being a “too-big-to-fail” institution because the regulatory 
costs that come with the label can be reduced.159 Icahn’s reasoning is not 
the easiest to follow because the insurance industry is heavily regulated 
to begin with. Moreover, the only reason a company like AIG can survive 
through the downs and recover is exactly because it is “too big to fail.” 
Nonetheless, the board had to use significant resources—mostly 
money and time—to prepare proxy materials to persuade other 
shareholders not to agree with Icahn. The battle lasted for months and 
ended in a “settlement.”160 AIG created two board seats: one for another 
activist who rallied with Icahn and the other for the managing director of 
Icahn Capital, the enterprise chaired by Carl Icahn.161 Although two seats 
were given, it was not entirely a bad loss for the company; it was an 
addition—not a replacement—of seats, and the company did not plan on 
changing its course of business strategy.162 
In light of such events, courts should hold the duty of loyalty against 
these shareholders, similar to the way in which traditional corporate law 
has bound directors and controlling shareholders. The duty of loyalty is 
appropriate because activists are often incentivized by the possibility of 
making quick profits; thus, their short-term gain can potentially harm the 
company and its remaining body of shareholders. The nature of the hedge 
fund business is generally characterized by volatile business strategies 
and a great deal of risk. With the combination of emphasizing short-term 
gains and volatile investment strategies, hedge fund shareholders are less 
likely to propose what is best for the company in the long-term. Especially 
if the demand involves a change in the nature of the business, their plan 
might differ substantially from the interests of the remaining shareholder 
body. Couple this tendency with the possibility of empty voting and the 
problem gets bigger. 
If a hedge fund shareholder engages in activism and 
contemporaneously lends its shares, the activist shareholder is infringing 
on the rights of other shareholders on potentially multiple levels. First, it 
is using its voting power when its economic stake does not match the vote 
ownership; thus, the exercise of such power seems unfair to other 
shareholders who hold on to their shares and engage in the voting process 
as part of their shareholder rights. Second, despite the possibility of 
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having zero net ownership of shares, hedge fund activists may push the 
board to replace some or all of its members or, as often happens, to split 
up the company. Breaking the company apart seems intuitively contrary 
to the communal shareholder interest. Why would shareholders buy stock 
in a company they want to break up in the first place? Last but not least, 
a hedge fund activist is often not the controlling shareholder. With 
dispersed ownership as a hallmark of public companies, it is difficult to 
possess majority ownership of shares. However, just because the number 
of shares owned and the percentage of residual reflected from the 
ownership are far removed from the numbers to be a controlling 
shareholder, that does not mean that the minority shareholder yields no 
influence. Take, for example, one of the more recent endeavors by Carl 
Icahn: his vehement opposition to the Xerox-Fuji merger. 163  Icahn 
himself did not own more than fifteen percent of shares in Xerox, yet he 
was able to command considerable attention and buzz in the news and the 
business world.164 
The soundness of these proposals is another matter, but the fact that 
these high-profile hedge fund activists can cause a great deal of 
commotion, both within and outside of the attacked corporation, calls for 
a needed mechanism that can curb their enthusiasm so as not to harm other 
shareholders’ interests. The high-profile status of activists, notably Carl 
Icahn, causes public agitation, but also creates a lot of distraction for both 
managers and shareholders. The board may feel forced to defend itself by 
responding to public statements, costing a lot of time, energy, and money. 
This can be problematic in two ways. First, the money used would come 
from the corporation, which disgruntled shareholders would view as 
waste (and courts may agree if lawsuits are brought). Second, the time 
spent defending against such activists takes time away from the directors 
running the business. Furthermore, media “hype” can cloud the judgment 
of other shareholders and, if the press attention is negative, stock prices 
can drop, which would directly harm shareholder interests. Applying the 
duty of loyalty works as a policy matter as well. A lot of hedge fund 
activists are disturbing the corporate tranquility, not just in one company, 
but several at the same time. The aggregate effect of these activities could 
lead to an unstable landscape in the corporate world. 
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Courts’ interpretations of the duty of loyalty in this light would allow 
for two possibilities. First, the possibility that the board of directors would 
sue activists hopefully curtails frivolous activist efforts. This is a less 
expensive measure because the threat of litigation can shape activist 
conduct by setting a standard, even before an activist shakes up the 
company. In the case where the board brings a suit, the court should 
engage in a balancing test between the activist’s proposal and the board’s 
reluctance to follow it. Courts should focus on the motives behind the 
proposal (e.g., to break up a company) and then attempt to weigh the 
potential benefits the activist stands to gain against proposed benefits to 
other shareholders. Second, the duty allows other shareholders to sue for 
damages to their interests in a company. Like the threat of a board taking 
action, these private suits may curb activist efforts because litigation is 
expensive and any press attention might negatively impact the hedge 
fund’s, and the activist’s, image and business. Although there is some 
concern about floodgates opening in shareholder litigation, it is not a 
significant problem because plaintiffs would have to articulate rather 
concisely what “bad act” an activist shareholder committed that resulted 
in some harm–direct or indirect–to the board of directors or other minority 
shareholders. 
CONCLUSION 
Shareholder franchise is one of the doctrines at the heart of American 
corporate law. The “one share, one vote” principle is a quintessential 
foundation to the operation of shareholder franchise. Nevertheless, with 
the shareholder ecosystem changing as a result of new trends in the 
financial world, such as hedge fund activism, the traditional principle 
needs to adjust accordingly. Keeping in alignment with the traditional 
concept of the duty of loyalty—often applied to self-dealing boards of 
directors, controlling shareholders engaging in unfair transactions, and 
closely held corporations—this Note argues that the duty of loyalty 
should extend to hedge fund activist shareholders who agitate companies 
in seeking to replace the board or split up the company. Hedge fund 
shareholders prevalently hedge their shares and participate in empty 
voting, which destroys the sanctity of the “one share, one vote” principle. 
Due to these activities, the volatile nature of the business, and the power 
of influence by many high-profile hedge funds, including the investors 
who head them, courts should be open to the application of the duty of 
218 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XXIV 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
loyalty in a fact-driven analysis when a board of directors or another 
minority shareholder brings suit. 
